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PREPARING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS FOR A
DISASTER:
INNER-CITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - WHO
SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD?
Michael Greenberger*
Preparing inner-city communities for catastrophic emergencies requires
careful planning, coordination, and implementation. Inner-city
communities, i.e., residents living in the core areas of the nation's
largest cities, often include low-income individuals, the elderly,
individuals with disabilities, and a high proportion of children. Many
of these individuals do not have the resources that emergency planners
often assume are available in the event of a natural or man-made
disaster, i.e., surplus food, water, and medical supplies; accessible
medical care; adequate private and/or public transportation for
evacuation; understandable and appropriate instructions for emergency
response; or nearby safe shelter.
As this article shows below, the concerns about these
vulnerabilities were evidenced by Hurricane Katrina and other events
(such as Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, recent excessive heat waves,
tornadoes, and flooding) that focused considerable attention on the
harsh adverse effects of disasters on unprepared, inner-city
communities. Specifically, the failure of the federal government to
respond to the needs of New Orleans' inner-city residents during
Hurricane Katrina prompted an immediate and much needed focus on
this issue. Yet, the federal government's many post-Katrina analyses
and reports, while comprehensive and thorough, do not establish a clear
agenda for solving this specific problem. In the absence of this federal
guidance and support, states and localities, by and large, do not have
the resources to lead and fund their own preparedness efforts for inner-
city communities.' Thus, very little has been done at any governmental
level - federal, state, or local - to focus preparedness efforts on inner-
* Law School Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; Director, University
of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security. A.B., Lafayette College;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania. The author would like to thank Deborah Silver, J.D.
and Michael J. McKeefery, J.D. Candidate, for their substantial assistance in
preparing this article.
' See Megan McHugh et al., How Prepared Are Americans for Public Health
Emergencies? Twelve Communities Weigh In, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRs 201, 208 (2004)
(discussing the lack of funding as a significant preparedness challenge for states and
local communities around the county).
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city communities that need the most assistance in the event of a
catastrophic disaster.
This article details the almost self-evident nature of problems
inner cities face in confronting catastrophic emergencies, and how
Katrina corroborated the serious nature of this problem. It then
critiques several of the federal government's post-mortem reports on
Katrina, focusing on the overly generalized recommendations that
provide no clear guidance in this area.
This article then proposes a pilot program for preparing inner-
city communities in the event of a disaster. This pilot program would
be developed in at least one small, well-defined inner-city
neighborhood. By starting with a pilot program within a single inner-
city neighborhood, the appropriate state or city might be able to find the
money to fund such a limited effort. In the absence of public funding,
private resources might alternatively be utilized. Private funding might
also supplement available government funds. This program would be a
cost-effective way in which to create a successful template for
preparing inner cities for emergencies that could then be duplicated
across the country with minimal effort.
I. SELF-EVIDENT CONCERNS
Although it is readily assumed in disaster planning that everyone has
access to a computer or the Internet, 2 this is obviously not always the
case. 3  For example, in terms of notification procedures, under the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) "Get Informed"
section for "Individuals and Families Planning" of the Pandemic Flu
website, the first place listed for acquiring reliable, accurate, and timely
information is a website address. 4 How will individuals for whom
2 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PREPARING MAKES SENSE - GET READY
Now 4 (2006), available at
http://www.ready.gov/america/_downloads/Ready-BrochureScreenEN_20040129.
pdf [hereinafter PREPARING MAKES SENSE] (advising citizens to "watch TV, listen to
the radio or check the Internet often for information or official instructions as it
becomes available").
3 During a disaster, residents may also experience electrical failures, causing
disruption to their televisions or other electrical devices. See e.g., David A.
Fahrenthold & Michael E. Ruane, Record Demand Strains Grid, WASH. POST, Aug. 3,
2006, at Al (reporting severe strains on power grids in the Washington area due to
record demand and extreme heat).
4 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Individuals & Families Planning,
http://pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab3.htmi (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
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access to a computer is limited or non-existent obtain this information?
Making a website the first place to gather information exemplifies the
incorrect assumption that every individual has the advanced resources
necessary to gather information.5 Furthermore, power outages during a
disaster may cause the inoperability of televisions, cellular telephones,
and computer websites, even if residents may, in fact, have access to
these resources.
6
Alternate methods of notification must be developed,
implemented, and tested. These might include neighborhood phone
trees, information sheets posted at a local community center, or other
pre-determined communication methods, such as battery-operated
radios. These methods would be designed to spread information
rapidly from a central community location, such as an elementary
school, to residents in a particular location, for example, within five
blocks of the school. It is also not enough to identify these methods
abstractly; citizens must be aware of and familiar with the location of
this information and where - and to whom - to report in the event of an
impending disaster.
In addition to informing residents about an emergency,
notification procedures must also tell individuals how to prepare and
5 Generally, inner-city residents have a difficult time obtaining access to advanced
technological services. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
CHARACTERISTICS AND CHOICES OF INTERNET USES 10 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01345.pdf ("FCC identified certain categories of
Americans who may have difficulty obtaining access to advanced
services... conclud[ing] that several barriers might hinder the ability of low-income,
inner-city residents to obtain advanced services." This is due to "the poor quality of
the telecommunications plant or of the inside wiring in multiple-tenant buildings, the
relatively high price of advanced services, the lower rates of computer ownership
among inner-city residents, and the lack of marketing by providers of advanced
services to low-income populations."). Id.
6 This was the case in the August 2003 power outage throughout the northeast U.S. as
well as parts of Canada. See, e.g., Lights Out: Huge Power Failure Hits Major Cities
in U.S. and Canada - 'Cascade' of Problems Appears to be Worst Since '96;
Subways, Cellphones Down - No Signs of a Terrorist Link, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2003, at Al [hereinafter Lights Out] ("In office towers all over the city, elevators
went out, lights went off and computers went down. Cellphone service was disrupted
. . . TV networks were still broadcasting from backup generators, but few had
working televisions to watch the news."); Jesse Drucker, Spotty Cellphone Service
Frustrates Customers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2003, at B4 ("[In the nation's most
severe power outage, many [wireless] customers .. faced maddingly slim chances of
calls getting through.").
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protect themselves before, during, and after a disaster. Residents
should be given guidance on which emergency supplies (food, water,
and necessary materials) to purchase, how to determine the most
affordable and durable supplies nearby, and how to store these
materials. Simply informing inner-city residents, many of whom have
limited financial means, to purchase a plethora of emergency supplies
without further guidance is virtually meaningless.
For example, on its Ready.Gov website, 7 the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) advises that an indiVidual or family should
include the following resources in an emergency preparedness kit: one
gallon of water per person per day for at least three days, at least a
three-day supply of non-perishable food, a portable first aid kit, a
battery-powered or hand crank radio, a flashlight with extra batteries, a
whistle to signal for help, dust masks, plastic sheeting and duct tape to
shelter-in-place, moist towelettes and garbage bags for personal
sanitation, a wrench or pliers to turn off utilities, a can opener for food,
and local maps.8  These may be sound recommendations for families
that have access to the Internet and can afford to take such measures.
However, these recommendations are wholly unrealistic for low-
income families with limited financial means even if these families
have access to a computer.
Ready.gov is not the only online resource providing sound
recommendations for the general population that may be wholly
unrealistic for many inner-city residents. Another example is the
CDC's recent preparedness guidelines for pandemic flu, which are far
7 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Ready.Gov - Prepare. Plan. Stay Informed.,
http://www.ready.gov/index.html (last visited July 11, 2006).
8 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Emergency Supply List,
http://www.ready.gov/america/downloads/checklist.pdf (last visited July 11, 2006)
[hereinafter Emergency Supply List]. The Emergency Supply List also lists the
following additional items to consider adding to an Emergency Supply Kit:
prescription medications and glasses; instant formula and diapers; pet food and extra
water for your pet; important family documents such as copies of insurance policies,
identification and bank account records in a waterproof, portable container; cash or
traveler's checks and change; emergency reference material such as a first aid book or
information from www.ready.gov; sleeping bag or warm blanket for each person; a
complete change of clothing including a long sleeved shirt, long pants and sturdy
shoes; household chlorine bleach and medicine dropper; fire extinguisher; matches in
a waterproof container; feminine supplies and personal hygiene items; mess kits,
paper cups, plates and plastic utensils, paper towels; paper and pencil; and books,
games, puzzles or other activities for children. Id. Although these items sound
reasonable, low-income, inner-city residents may be unable to afford to acquire these
additional items.
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more extensive than recommendations for a general disaster. 9 The
website advises that individuals store: a two-week supply of water and
food; extra prescription drugs; over-the-counter pain relievers, stomach
remedies, cough and cold medicines, fluids with electrolytes, and
vitamins; and non-perishable food, such as ready-to-eat cans of meats,
fish, fruits, vegetables, beans, and soups. 10 Again, without further
guidance on how to find the most affordable types of these items, as
well as how to store these items, it is almost a certainty that individuals
with limited financial means will not have adequate access to
emergency supplies that they may desperately need in the event of a
disaster.
Methods must be developed to assist inner-city residents in
determining which supplies are truly necessary to purchase and how to
determine the most affordable and durable types of these supplies. This
should involve careful review of the federal preparedness guidelines to
create tailored and specific lists of items and less expensive
alternatives. For example, suppose a family of four purchasing one
gallon of water per person per day for at least three days spends $1.29
for one gallon of water. 11 This is the listed price for a store brand of
"Drinking Water - Filtered."' 12 Purchasing water alone for this family
will cost approximately $15. Now, suppose instead that this family
was provided with the name and location of an exact type and brand of
water to purchase: "Acadia Spring Water" at the same store for
$0.99/gallon. 13 This will yield a savings of about $3 for that family.
Alternatively, buying this quantity of a premium brand of water from a
membership warehouse in bulk will cost approximately $11.14
9 Compare U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Pandemic Flu Planning
Checklist for Individuals & Families,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/pdf/Individuals.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2006)
[hereinafter Checklist for Individuals & Families], with Emergency Supply List,
supra note 8.
10 Checklist for Individuals & Families, supra note 9.
" The figure of $1.29 was determined by examining the listing price of a store-brand
gallon of water at the online grocer Peapod's website. See Peapod - Online Grocery
Store, http://www.peapod.com (follow "Groceries for Your Home" hyperlink;
provide a Zip Code and follow the "Go" hyperlink; follow the "Browse Aisles"
hyperlink; follow the "Beverages" hyperlink; follow the "Water" hyperlink; and the
"Non-carbonated" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 2, 2006).
12 Id.
13 id.
14 The dollar amount for purchasing water from a warehouse club was based on
pricing obtained from the Sam's Club website. See Sam's Club - Bulk Water,
2007]
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Obviously, individuals make these types of financial choices in
everyday life, yet, having a guide with the actual prices, brands, and
cheapest alternatives for all of the listed food and water supplies at
nearby stores could certainly ease the purchasing process. In the same
manner, even guides that list locations, least expensive prices,
durability, and suggested quantities for items such as first aid materials
and flashlights, for example, would make the process much easier for a
family who, for financial or logistical reasons, would not have the
inclination or ability to purchase these supplies otherwise.
It is worth mentioning that residents may need assistance with
storage of these items once they are purchased. Inner-city residents
might not have the physical space offered by an outdoor shed, garage,
or other external facility for easy storage of, for example, twelve
gallons of water. This obviously will not be a concern for all residents,
but for those who may need to find creative dry, cool, and ideal storage
spaces within a smaller home, a guide or pamphlet suggesting
alternative locations and ideas for storage (such as spreading out the
supplies between a hallway closet, underneath a bed, or in a basement)
might be useful.
It is also self-evident that evacuation and shelter decisions are
difficult for those with limited or no access to private transportation and
limited resources. 15 It is not appropriate to just assume that everyone
knows where to go or how to get out of a city when ordered to
evacuate. 16  Moreover, although state and local government partners
may provide public transportation for evacuation during a disaster, the
locations of emergency bus routes may be different from the normal,
designated routes. Prior to a disaster, residents should be aware of and
familiar with the location of these temporary routes and particular bus
stops. Each neighborhood should have its own map or guide detailing
the exact locations of the emergency routes and bus stops in the event
that one route is completely flooded or non-traversable. This way,
people will know the location of the closest alterative routes and
corresponding bus stops.
Certainly, making decisions regarding whether to evacuate or
go to a public shelter may also be difficult during a disaster. As is true
of evacuation in general, getting to the shelter may be problematic if
http://www.samsclub.con/shopping/navigate.do?catg=2690 (last visited Aug. 3,
2006).
15 Shelter refers to remaining in place to avoid any uncertainty outside. PREPARING
MAKES SENSE, supra note 2, at 4.
16 See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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the shelter is not located nearby and residents need transportation to the
shelter. Individuals may also not be familiar with the location of public
shelters. Maps and guides with lists of nearby shelters and existing
infrastructure at each shelter would be very useful when determining
which facilities will be available at each one. This information would
include the availability of showers or bathtubs; access to microwaves,
ovens, or other kitchen devices; as well as an idea of the sleeping
arrangements at each facility.
These self-evident concerns represent just a few examples of the
serious challenges for preparing inner-city communities to deal with
catastrophic disasters.
II. HURRICANE KATRINA
Hurricane Katrina corroborates the self-evident concerns discussed
above. The effects of Katrina were staggering and catastrophic. It
remains to be seen whether the Gulf Coast and New Orleans, in
particular, will ever fully recover from a disaster of this magnitude.
On August 29, 2005, sections of the levee system in New
Orleans breached, and approximately 80 percent of New Orleans was
underwater at peak flooding, which in some places was twenty feet
deep. 17 The hurricane killed an estimated 1,527 residents from the New
Orleans metropolitan area, and displaced 770,000 others. 18  Nearly
100,000 inner-city New Orleans residents could not evacuate because
they lacked the means to do so. New Orleans' inner-city residents
could not afford the costs of emergency lodging, food, and
transportation, which could have easily exceeded $1000 for three
days. 19  Lawlessness and desperation abounded generally. At the
17 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA,
H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 73 (2006) available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/katrina/index.html [hereinafter A FAILURE
OF INITIATIVE].
18 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS
LEARNED 7 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED]; U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION
STILL UNPREPARED 2-1 (2006), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/-files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf [hereinafter A NATION STILL
UNPREPARED].
19 The average cost for food, lodging, and transportation exceeding a thousand dollars
for three days refers to a family of four. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note
18, at 1-5.
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Superdome in particular, which served as a designated "special needs
shelter," the electricity and plumbing failed for roughly 20,000 -
30,000 individuals.
20
Almost five months after the storm, basic services remained
inaccessible for inner-city residents: 85 percent of public schools in
Orleans parish had still not reopened, and, in the metropolitan area,
approximately two-thirds of the retail food establishments, half of the
bus routes, and half of the major hospitals remained closed.2 1 During
the catastrophe, many inner-city residents either lost or misplaced
essential documents, such as insurance information, birth certificates,
marriage licenses, and medical records. 22  City residents living in
nursing homes were especially devastated as many nursing homes
lacked adequate evacuation plans and emergency resources.23
As further evidence, evacuation attempts essentially failed for
those individuals without private transportation. 24 Many were initially
caught off guard with minimal warning of the approaching disaster.25
While thousands of New Orleans residents did not evacuate or seek
shelter, roughly 1.2 million Louisiana residents evacuated themselves
26in private vehicles. It appears that those who had the resources to do
20 Id. at 1-5, 22-7.
21 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 18, at 9.
22 Id.
23 A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 18, at Executive Summary 13-14.
Seventy-one percent of the victims in Louisiana were older than sixty, and forty-
seven percent of those were over seventy-five. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 18, at
8.
24 Most of the city residents exclusively relied on public transportation for all
transportation needs. See, e.g., John Renne, Car-less in the Eye of Katrina,
PLANETIZEN, Sep. 6, 2005, http://www.planetizen.com/node/17255 (discussing
transportation patterns among New Orleans residents prior to the Hurricane Katrina
disaster).
25 For example, during the Hurricane Katrina disaster, many individuals were
unprepared when Mayor Nagin issued an evacuation order at the last minute. A
NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 18, at 16-6-16-8 (providing a timeline of
local preparation prior to Hurricane Katrina's landfall). On August 26, Mayor Nagin
first announced that city officials were monitoring the storm. Id. at 16-7. On August
27, Nagin advised citizens for the first time that they should begin to prepare for the
storm's impact. Id. At 9:30 a.m. on August 28, just one day prior to Katrina's
landfall, Mayor Nagin finally issued a mandatory evacuation order for the City of
New Orleans. Id. This late notice meant that residents had a single day to evacuate
the area. Individuals with limited access to a television, radio, phone, or the Internet
would simply not be able to safely evacuate the area under this scenario.
26 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17, at 64.
[VOL. 10.2:291
PREPARING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
so left the area safely. 27 However, neither Mayor Nagin nor Governor
Blanco ordered a mandatory evacuation until Sunday, August 28 -
nineteen hours before projected landfall.28 Many citizens believed that
had officials ordered this mandatory evacuation sooner, countless lives
could have been saved. 29 The frustration felt by residents regarding the
lack of evacuation assistance by the government - at all three levels - is
exemplified by the words of New Orleans citizens and other concerned
parties commenting on the evacuation attempts:
"Why would you get in the public media and ask a city, where 80
percent of its citizens ride public transit, to evacuate? What [were] they
supposed to do? Fly?"
30
"I think, unfortunately, a lot of the destruction that we saw, that persons
were unable to safely evacuate, was because they were basically
poor."
3 1
"We know that people were not able to evacuate because some people
just didn't own cars. ' 32
These comments evidence some of the key challenges that arise
when evacuating inner-city populations: a lack of access to private
transportation, a lack of financial means to evacuate on their own, and
an inability to leave the affected area safely without additional
assistance. Planning for the evacuation of inner-city communities must
therefore involve "accounting for those who cannot evacuate on their
27 Id. at 107 ("The Louisiana evacuation for the general population, including
contraflow, worked very well. Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco and other state
officials labeled the implementation of this evacuation as 'masterful' and as one of
the most successful emergency evacuations in history.") (quoting Hearing on
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before
Select Comm., 109th Cong. 67 (2005) (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco,
Governor of Louisiana) (Blanco: "I am very happy to talk about our evacuation
process, because it the one thing that we did masterfully.")).
28 ld. at 109.
29 Id. at 111.
30 Id. (quoting statement of Dyan French, New Orleans citizen and community
leader).
31 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17, at I1I (quoting statement of Terrol
Williams, New Orleans citizen and evacuee).
32 Id. at 112 (quoting statement of Barbara Arnwine, Executive Director for the
Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights).
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own."33  The New Orleans Evacuation Plan actually specifically
addressed the issue of those without access to transportation. Despite
this, the city did not follow the plan and made no attempt to evacuate
these people; furthermore, the preparations for sheltering these
individuals were "woefully inadequate."
34
The Katrina calamity presents sad corroborating evidence of
what can happen when a disaster strikes a densely populated urban area
and its inner-city residents are not prepared or protected.
H. LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL GUIDANCE
After Hurricane Katrina, considerable attention was paid to the federal
government's response efforts, particularly the failure to respond
effectively to New Orleans' inner-city residents. 35 The federal post-
33 Id.
34 Id. at 113. The New Orleans Evacuation Plan, in part, states that:
Special arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable to transport
themselves.., additional personnel will be recruited to assist in evacuation
procedures as needed . . . if an evacuation order is issued without the
mechanisms needed to disseminate the information to the affected persons,
then we face the possibility of having large numbers of people either
stranded and left to the mercy of the storm, or left in areas impacted by
toxic materials . . . transportation will be provided to those persons
requiring public transportation from the area . . . approximately 100,000
Citizens of New Orleans do not have means of personal transportation.
Id. (quoting City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 24,
45, 50, 55 (2004)).
35 See, e.g., A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 18, at Executive Summary 2
(discussing the many factors that contributed to the failure of government at all levels
to plan, prepare for and respond aggressively to the storm). See also, e.g., Edward
Epstein, As With Katrina, Federal Role Caused Discord, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 2006,
at A13 (stating that President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff, and former Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Michael
Brown have been widely criticized for the federal response to Hurricane Katrina);
Michael A. Fletcher & Spencer S. Hsu, Bush: Congress 'Shortchanged' New
Orleans; Touring Gulf Coast, President Calls for Restoration of $1.5 Billion for
Levee Repairs, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at Al (discussing the fact that President
Bush told the media on March 8, 2006 that "Congress has been slow to provide
funding to rebuild housing destroyed by Hurricane Katrina"); Dahleen Glanton,
Americans Helping Each Other; Life's Essentials, All Donated, Can be Had in a
Parking Lot, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2005, at CIO (emphasizing the failure of the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina by focusing upon a Mississippi church's efforts to
support citizens affected by the disaster); Patrick McGreevy, Katrina Debacle
Prompts LA. to Prepare for Disasters, Attacks, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at B3
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mortem on Hurricane Katrina, as applicable to inner-city emergency
preparedness, illustrates a distanced and vague approach. For example,
recommendations generated for the February 23, 2006 White House
Report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned36 were meant to ensure "that the harsh lessons of Hurricane
Katrina need never be learned again," even though the authors of this
report acknowledged that "[n]o matter how prepared we think we are,
we must work every day to improve." 37  However, of the 125
recommendations in this report, only eight are even arguably applicable
to improving inner-city emergency preparedness efforts. 38  Indeed,
these eight recommendations deal with community preparedness in the
most general way. They do not offer concrete action steps or solutions
for better preparedness of inner-city communities or low-income
residents.
For example, one of the recommendations is that "DHS should
develop tools for State and local governments to use in order to
prepare, train, exercise, and engage citizens and communities in all
areas of preparedness. "39 While highlighting that "special
consideration should be given to persons with disabilities, health
problems, language barriers, income barriers, and unaccompanied
minors, the recommendation provides that "tools" refer to "instructor
guides and participant handbooks for classroom based instruction,
identified standardized skills and capabilities, and strategic planning
guidance."4 1  The report suggests that developing these tools at a
(discussing that the federal government's poor response to Hurricane Katrina has
prompted some state and local governments to construct their own emergency
response plans).
36 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 18.
37 Id. at Introductory Letter.
38 Id. at 87-123. These eight dealt with the following issues: incorporation of non-
governmental and private aid into emergency planning, training, exercises, and
disaster relief effort; public figures serving as spokespersons to promote citizen and
community preparedness; increased grant funding for these efforts; building baseline
skills and capabilities for all citizens and communities; development of tools for state
and local governments to prepare, train, exercise, and engage citizen preparedness;
inclusion of individual and community preparedness into current elementary and
secondary education programs; utilization of the DHS Lessons Learned website; and
establishment of state tax relief holidays to allow citizens to purchase disaster
preparedness supplies. Id. at 115, 121-23 (Recommendations #100, 119, 120-125).
39 Id. at Recommendations 122 (emphasis added).
40 Id. The recommendation also advises that special consideration be given to
contemplate household pets and other animals. Id.
41 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 18, at 122.
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national level with key stakeholder partnerships, such as non-
governmental organizations, the private sector, emergency responders,
and experts on vulnerable populations, "will achieve economies of
scale [and] elevate National preparedness without depleting scarce
resources at the local level. ' 42 This guidance is vague for a number of
reasons. First, what information is to be included in these guides and
participant handbooks? Does this involve instructing individuals on
preparation techniques, survival during a disaster, learning how to cope
with the effects of a disaster? Perhaps it covers all of these. However,
without more specificity, it is difficult to ascertain what these
instruction materials will actually accomplish. Further, the language in
the recommendation suggests that there will not be state and local
government input on the substance of these handbooks even though
these tools are designed for these entities to use.
Without further guidance on these issues, it is difficult to
determine what these recommendations actually mean - and whether
they are realistic. Furthermore, the federal government must focus -
and rightfully so - on the other 117 recommendations that bear no
relationship to inner-city preparedness in order to strengthen the overall
federal response. As a result, emergency preparedness for inner-city
communities essentially seems off of the-federal radar screen.
This is exemplified by Congress' post-Katrina advice that
affords no added specificity in terms of emergency preparedness for
inner-city communities.43 For example, in its report A Nation Still
Unprepared, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs offers seven foundational recommendations and
eighty-one building block recommendations,44 none of which deal
specifically with inner-city preparedness, let alone general community
preparedness. One recommendation from this report advises that "[a]ll
evacuation plans must provide for populations that do not have the
means to evacuate. ' '45 It further provides that "DHS and DOT [the
42 Id.
43 See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17; Hurricane Katrina: GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Before
the S. Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06442t.pdf; A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra
note 18. See also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO Reports and Testimonies
Related to Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Reconstruction,
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/dprr.html (last visited July 13, 2006).
44 A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 18, at Recommendations -1-29.
45 Id. at Recommendations 
- 21 (description of Recommendation 45).
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Department of Transportation] should make available assistance to
state and local governments for the development of these plans to
ensure that the nation's most vulnerable citizens are not left behind in a
disaster." This recommendation offers, at best, a conclusion without
action steps or suggestions on how DHS and DOT should assist state
and localities in making these plans. Does this mean simply logistical
assistance? Or should state and local governments look to these
agencies for additional funding? Also, this advice does not appear to
be tailored specifically to inner-city residents who may have different
needs when it comes to evacuation procedures than other vulnerable
population groups. Finally, the recommendation does not indicate what
types of "plans" should be developed - do these plans include how to
get to evacuation routes for citizens awaiting pickup or do these plans
simply list available evacuation routes. While this recommendation
certainly promotes a desired outcome, it does not offer specific
guidance or provide for direct funding to ensure that inner-city
residents will not be left behind in a disaster.
The House of Representatives' Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
issued its Final Report in February 2006, entitled A Failure of
Initiative. This report is essentially an elaboration on the findings from
the Committee's hearings and investigations over the course of a five
46
month period. While extremely factual and worthwhile as a summary
about the efforts of local, state, and federal officials prior to, during,
and after the disaster, it does not offer any recommendations for
improvement or guidelines for future actions regarding the
preparedness of inner-city communities.
States and localities also, as a general matter, do not have
adequate funding for preparedness efforts designed specifically for
inner-city communities without clear direction or funding from the
federal government.47 Moreover, with the recent reductions by DHS in
urban security funds this year in cities such as Washington, D.C., New
York, and even New Orleans, some states and localities might actually
have decreased funding for existing community preparedness efforts.4 8
It will therefore be necessary for all interested parties - state and local
government emergency management officials, non-governmental
organizations, public health practitioners, representative community
46 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17, at 9.
41 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
48 See Dan Eggen & Mary Beth Sheridan, Anti-Terror Funding Cut in D.C. and New
York, WASH. POST, June 1, 2006, at Al.
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leaders, and appropriate charities - to work together and take the lead
in creating and implementing specific programs designed to help solve
the problem.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PREPAREDNESS
PILOT PROGRAM
In the absence of specific guidance from the federal government and
the lack of adequate funding to state and local governments, perhaps
one method of achieving a solution is to begin a small, community-
wide pilot program (or series of pilot programs) within a well-defined
inner-city neighborhood that is designed to prepare its residents for a
disaster. If successful, these pilot programs could then be duplicated
across the country with minimal cost 49 and could stimulate funding for
similar efforts in other cities. Such a program should have several of
the following key characteristics.
First, the program should have input from all relevant
community-wide stakeholders, including state and local government
emergency management officials, non-governmental organizations,
public health practitioners, representative community leaders, and
appropriate non-profit organizations, to collaborate on the most
effective and appropriate preparedness measures for their inner-city
neighborhoods. This will ensure that these stakeholders comment
upon, and have familiarity with, emergency plans as they relate to their
own inner-city communities, rather than having individuals outside of
these communities impose rules, guidelines, and standards from afar.
Second, the program should contain components based on the
particular problems faced by inner-city residents in preparing for a
disaster, namely notification procedures, access to emergency supplies,
and information on evacuation and shelters. In terms of notification
procedures, the program should establish communication systems and
notification techniques, including, for example, special telephone
numbers or the locations of nearby emergency resource centers that
function effectively during a disaster to ensure that inner-city residents
receive up-to-date emergency information. This emergency
information could also include advice on how to create community
49 The University of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security (CHHS)
estimates a program of this nature, depending on geographic location, would cost
between $375,000 and $400,000. This includes the purchase of supplies as well as
the organizers' salaries, expenses, and other costs. These estimates are based on
budgets prepared for grant applications (on file with author).
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call-down lists or telephone trees, how to gather contact information for
residents within a particular area, and how to notify residents with
pertinent emergency information door-to-door. The program should
also include information on how to organize community door-to-door
notifications of emergencies in the event of a power failure. This
should be accomplished by designating responsible individuals for each
block or street who will go door-to-door to get information to all
residents of that block or street that cannot get out otherwise.
Additionally, the program should provide guidance for using battery
operated radios and lists of particular stations for up-to-date news and
information. This will be especially helpful for individuals that do not
have access to a computer or that experience service disruption to their
50televisions or cellular telephones due to electrical damage.
The program should create a realistic list of what a family of
four would actually need in the event of a disaster. This would include
information on the exact quantity of food and water needed to survive
for several days. For example, instead of simply telling residents to
stock "ready-to-eat canned meats, fruits and vegetables, protein or fruit
bars, dry cereal or granola, peanut butter, dried fruit, nuts, crackers,
etc.,' the program could offer specific details such as how many cans
of meats, boxes of crackers, or packages of protein bars to buy each day
per person, instead of just lists of suggested items.
The program should also help residents determine the most
affordable and durable brands and types of emergency supplies. To
accomplish this task, the program will most likely involve a component
of surveying neighborhood stores, outlet centers, and wholesale
membership clubs to find the least expensive, yet durable, materials
and supplies, and relaying that information back to the community in
an easy-to-read, understandable format of informational maps, guides,
and pamphlets. This information should also include the possibility of
creating community-wide "co-ops" to buy these supplies less
expensively by purchasing in bulk. The program should establish
community outreach centers (e.g., schools, community centers,
churches, or other nearby public facilities) for those who cannot afford
any supplies.
Residents should also learn to create, store, and utilize a "go"
kit. A "go" kit is a portable kit that includes information, vital records,
50 See supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text.
5' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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and supplies needed in an emergency situation.52 In the event of a
disaster, residents can "grab" the "go" kit and have emergency supplies
and information on hand.53 Teaching inner-city residents to prepare
and utilize a "go" kit will enable them to move quickly and effectively
from residences and work places when an emergency requires
evacuation.
The program should also teach residents how to store surplus
food, water, and supplies either within their homes, places of work, or
community resource centers. Information should be provided regarding
storage techniques, such as suggestions of cool, dry areas within a
home in which to store food, water, and supplies.
The program should address strategies to ensure, to the
maximum extent practical, that residents have access to medical care
during a catastrophe.
The program should provide residents with understandable
guidance and information about the most effective and safe means of
evacuation. Within each neighborhood, emergency planners should
formulate and provide to city residents emergency plans that
incorporate evacuation procedures and routes, as well as available
public transportation sites for residents awaiting evacuation. If
individuals know the fastest - and safest - routes to these transportation
sites, they will waste no additional time trying to ascertain this
information during a disaster. Easy-to-read maps and guidelines should
be created and provided to residents.
The program should also provide information about safe and
effective means to find public shelters, as well as how to shelter-in-
place. In the absence of a mandatory evacuation order by local or state
officials, residents may not know when it might be better to find a
public shelter or remain in place. In the same manner that residents
should be given information on finding evacuation routes and how to
get to transportation sites, so too should the program provide similar
maps and guides to nearby public shelters. This should include detailed
information on what to bring to the shelter, what types of facilities
(bathrooms, showers, kitchen, etc.) are available at the shelter, and how
to decide when to go to a shelter or stay put in the absence of guidance
from local authorities.
52 U.S. Dep't of Educ., Emergency Response and Crisis Management Technical
Assistance Center, http://www.ercm.org/index.cfm?event=DGCfaq&tpc=7&q=46#46
(last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
53 Id.
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The program should inform residents of the advantages and
disadvantages of remaining in place, including how to choose safe
places to stay put, how to create an interior "safe" room if one does not
exist in the home, and what types of supplies might be needed to create
a temporary shelter within homes, places of work, or other locations.
Finally, once a viable program is created, implemented, and
tested in a particular community, it could then be copied and used as a
model for other communities around the country. As the initial
programs would be designed for small, well-defined areas within a
community, this could help ease initial costs. States and local
jurisdictions or, alternatively, private non-profit sources, could take the
lead by funding these small pilot programs. The success of such
models could generate further public and/or private funding for further
development. Although a preparedness program of this type may not
be the ultimate solution to ensuring all inner-city residents are
completely prepared for a disaster, it is surely a positive start in an
environment where virtually nothing is being done.
V. CONCLUSION
As the nation's cities have long been considered prime targets for
terrorist attacks, and as recent events have highlighted the unique
vulnerability of cities during natural disasters, inner-city residents must
be prepared and protected in the event of a disaster. As evidenced in
New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, the substantial attention that
was needed to initiate massive rescue efforts for inner-city residents
exacerbated the effects of what was already one of the most damaging
natural disasters in U.S. history.
54
The federal government's analysis and post-mortem reports
from the Katrina experience offered nothing more than highly
generalized support and guidance for inner-city emergency
preparedness efforts. Without further funding or specific direction
from the federal government, state and local governments alone cannot
be expected to support preparedness initiatives. Therefore,
stakeholders at all levels - state and local government emergency
management officials, non-governmental organizations, public health
practitioners, representative community leaders, and appropriate private
charities - must take the lead and work together to establish cost-
54 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 17, at 7 (concluding that "[n]ot only would
[Hurricane] Katrina become the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history, it
would also prove to be one of the deadliest").
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effective pilot programs that incorporate all the necessary components
for inner-city communities in order to be prepared for a catastrophe.
The preparedness programs should then be used as templates for the
development of similar models throughout the nation.
